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 Post-industrial cities across the United States continue to reel from the effects of 
neoliberalism, which prompted a loss in their manufacturing base and a reduction of federal aid 
to municipalities. As a result, cities have become more creative and entrepreneurial in their 
redevelopment strategies. Oftentimes, these strategies include public-private partnerships and 
financial instruments to fund and build projects. A growing body of literature analyzes the 
effects of financialization. This work adds to this collection. I argue that local contexts, 
particularly the spatial, economic, and institutional arrangements of a city heavily determine the 
effectiveness of a finance-based redevelopment project. I illustrate this point through a study of 
Hartford, Connecticut’s Downtown North Redevelopment Project, referred to as DoNo. I argue 
that Hartford’s specific landscape of inequality, both within the city itself, and between the city 
and surrounding neighborhoods, interacted with DoNo’s financial scheme to maintain the status 
quo of inequality in the city. In this way, Hartford’s specific context set the parameters for 
DoNo’s ability to bring positive, meaningful development to its communities. DoNo simply did 
not pay close enough attention to Hartford’s landscape to effectively overcome the city’s 
economic challenges and divisions. This work combines theoretical analysis with Hartford’s 
lived experiences to articulate this point. Overall, this work calls for agents of redevelopment and 
municipalities to pay greater attention to local contexts in order to make more informed decisions 

















“Take Us Out of the Ball Game”: An Introduction to DoNo, Hartford, and Urban 
Financing 
 
“Take us out of the ball game. Take us out of the park. Don’t buy us some peanuts and 
cracker jacks, not ‘til Hartford is back in the black” (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 
2014b). 
 Passionately sung to a jam-packed room in the Hartford Public Library, this song 
provided a bit of comedic relief to an intense public forum that took place in the fall of 2014. The 
discussion centered on the merits of a development project in the city of Hartford: DoNo. With a 
silly sounding name, DoNo has become a local hot-button issue. This quote hints at the 
discontents many residents expressed, and continue to express, regarding the project.  
 “Take us out of the ball game. Take us out of the park.” The “us” references the people of  
Hartford, the capital city of Connecticut. Spatially, Hartford is fragmented into a collection of 
relatively distinct subsections, see Figure 1. The two interstate highways, I-84 and I-91, running 
through the city effectively bisect the landscape into North and South Ends. The Downtown 
District, Hartford’s most profitable census tract, is located just below the highway interchange 
(Census Reporter 2019). The Downtown District includes high rise office buildings, interesting 
restaurants, and even a concert venue. Take the next highway exit and one finds a very different 
and rather desolate landscape. This area, officially known as Downtown North before 2014,  
encompasses 81 properties on 123.1 acres, 16% percent of which were vacant as of 2008 (City of 
Hartford Redevelopment Agency 2008, 1). Unused parking lots covered most of the remaining 
region. In fact, then Mayor Pedro Segarra accurately referred to the area as “sea of parking lots” 
(Gosselin 2020).  
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Figure 1: Hartford’s Subdivisions. The North East subdivision is most commonly referred to as the North End, but 
the surrounding areas of Blue Hills and Upper Albany are treated and behave similarly. The Downtown North 
Redevelopment Project is located at the tip of the Downtown area, comprising roughly the triangle between Clay 
Arsenal and North Meadows (Hartford Maps).  
 
Hartford eyed Downtown North for redevelopment as early as 2008. In that year, the City 
of Hartford Redevelopment Agency released a comprehensive survey of the area and its potential 
to act as a bridge between Hartford’s central business district, the Downtown Area, and its 
generally poorer North End (City of Hartford Redevelopment Agency 2008, 5). The “park” in 
question came into play in 2014 as Mayor Pedro Segarra stood on the steps of City Hall on a 
sunny, June day to announce his newest achievement: he had saved baseball for the state. 
According to Segarra, the AA team for the Minnesota Twins, formerly known as the New Britain 
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Rock Cats, completed their contractual obligation to the city of New Britain and was poised to 
leave Connecticut. Mayor Segarra, seizing the opportunity to catalyze development in his city, 
offered to build the team a new, professional-grade stadium if they set their roots in Hartford 
(Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014a). These roots were to be planted at 1214 Main St., 
amongst the sea of parking lots. After building the stadium, Segarra would then redevelop the 
expanses of asphalt. Segarra imagined retail, office, and residential spaces on the remaining 
parcels of land in Downtown North. This entire project came to be known as DoNo, a hip, 
shortened version of Downtown North. In the words of Mayor Segarra, the city of Hartford felt 
comfortable that DoNo was a “reasonable plan” to “increase vibrancy in the area” (Office of 
Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014a). 
 
Figure 2: Downtown North. The Downtown North delineated above was divided into seven parcels. The interchange 
between I-84 and I-91 is shown at the bottom right of Downtown North (Utile).  
Steeves 8 
 
 Many residents took issue with Segarra’s comments and overall vision for the area. While 
no one denied the need for more development in the north end of Hartford, the choice to finance 
first the stadium, then the rest of DoNo, remained a contentious issue. Here lies the biggest 
controversy regarding the project. During the public debates, many argued that Hartford simply 
did not have the financial resources to pay for the stadium. Some thought that even the owners of 
the Rock Cats should pay for the construction (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014c). Others 
believed that developments of such magnitude would be better spent elsewhere, such as the 
public library. The opening song sums up these sentiments with the lyric “not ‘til Hartford is 
back in the black.”  
 
Figure 3: Renderings of DoNo’s proposal. The baseball stadium anchors the project, surrounded by retail, housing, 
and office buildings (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014c).  
 
Steeves 9 
Many cities across the United States consider building downtown stadiums. Similar 
debates could occur in cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, or Los Angeles, as issues 
regarding the financing of municipal development projects arise across the county. Each year 
cities break ground on new, expensive projects with hopes of improving their social, economic, 
and cultural situations in specific districts. Each project requires unique financing arrangements 
that create diverse outcomes. DoNo is just one example. Looking at the particulars of DoNo’s 
financing agreement, what it committed Hartford to do, at what costs, and whose cost to bear, 
provides valuable insight into the nature of financed-based development projects in post-
industrial American cities. This work pays close attention to Hartford’s specific urban landscape. 
Doing so reveals interesting patterns regarding the consequences of finance-based developments 
and calls into question their ability to enact positive change for local communities.  
 
The Devil is in the Details: Can Urban Financing Create Positive Change for Cities? 
 Municipalities generate revenue from a variety of different sources, including taxes, 
federal and state governmental aid, and other miscellaneous fees collected by the local 
government. The configuration of these different funding sources in local budgets looks different 
now that it did in the middle decades of the twentieth century. In 1970, federal aid accounted for 
approximately 15% of municipal revenues and state aid accounted for around 22% (Pagano and 
Hoene 2018, 4). In 2012, those percentages hovered at 6.4% and 18%, respectively (Pagano and 
Hoene 2018, 4). With this significant decrease in intergovernmental transfers, municipalities 
must generate most of their revenue, around 75% from taxes and fees. Of that 75%, property 
taxes account for the majority of municipal revenue, with income taxes comprising the smallest 
portion of the average city’s budget (Tax Policy Center 2017). This shift matters because the 
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amount of tax revenue, and where that revenue comes from, affects a city’s ability to pursue 
development projects. 
 Neoliberalism, the international economic phenomena, explains this shift in municipal 
revenues. At its most basic definition, neoliberalism prioritizes free, global markets over 
governmental meddling in the economy. Becoming the dominant doctrine in the 1970s with the 
administration of Ronald Reagan, neoliberalism restructured state and federal economic policies 
to no longer provide substantial amounts of aid to municipalities (Monbiot 2016). At the same 
time, neoliberal policies accelerated deindustrialization. Previously, many American cities, such 
as Hartford, Salem, and Detroit, bustled with manufacturing. These cities housed middle class 
industrial workers and their families. However, as countries began outsourcing their industries 
during the height of the neoliberal era, manufacturing became less prominent in the United States 
(Monbiot 2016). Factories turned off the lights, leaving cities and previously middle class 
workers without income. These cities are referred to as post-industrial, referring to the urban 
landscape left in the wake of a once industrial hub.  
 The decline in income taxes in part explains the contemporary emphasis on property 
taxes. Together with the lack of governmental assistance and the decrease in middle-class 
working opportunities, cities look to the land to generate revenue. With less outside assistance, 
these urban governments become more independent, giving rise to the term “entrepreneurial 
city” in urban-geography. The entrepreneurial city attempts to create new opportunities, 
branding, and experiences to improve the lives of the people within the city and to attract people 
to come visit to generate income (Roberts and Schein 1993, 22). This often involves new 
construction or renovation of existing buildings. However, finding the revenue for these 
developments remains a challenge for cities already reeling from the loss of their industrial base. 
From this predicament grows the popularity and diversity of municipal financing.  
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 Financial markets have grown tremendously throughout the last few decades, particularly 
between 2001 and 2007, and have developed a variety of different financial instruments (Weber 
2010). The general principle behind financing is to generate revenue through the trading of 
stocks, bonds, or other intangible assets. For cities, financing has become an indispensable tool 
to pay for their desired development projects. In fact, many cities have come to use financial 
instruments with more frequency, as seen by greater municipal debt and the privatization of 
public assets present in urban budgets (Weber 2010). By engaging financial markets, cities, 
either on their own or through private companies, gain upfront access to capital that they 
otherwise would not have. Investors are attracted to municipal financial instruments because they 
are relatively less risky than commercial bonds and stocks (Weber 2010). Taking the market’s 
attraction to municipal debt with the cities’ need for capital, an interesting dynamic is produced. 
Cities become financialized. The term financialization describes the process by which cities 
become increasingly more integrated into financial markets (Weber 2010). In doing so, new 
financial instruments are created for capital and, in turn, become critical tools fueling the 
revitalization of post-industrial cities. They have become fixtures of urban policy; however, 
sometimes with unsavory consequences.  
 These consequences hold profound implications for the health of municipalities, and thus 
deserve academic attention. This work is guided by the question: how do financial instruments 
interact with urban landscapes and to what effect? Hartford’s Downtown North Redevelopment 
Project serves as the case study. In particular, this work adds to the growing body of literature 
regarding the effectiveness of financial instruments in helping post-industrial cities acclimate to a 
new, modern purpose. I will focus on financing of the baseball stadium in Hartford through the 
newly created Stadium Authority. Authorities like these are commonplace in post-industrial 
development projects. As quasi-public entities, they exist between the realms of government and 
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finance, and provide an useful entry point into understanding how public-private partnerships 
negotiate the logic of financial capital into the municipal fold.  
Ultimately, this work argues that while financial instruments hold significant power for 
municipalities, a city’s local economic, social, and political contexts remain the primary 
determinants of the outcome of the project. Using the case of Hartford’s Downtown North 
Redevelopment Plan, I argue that the financial arrangement used to build the stadium benefited 
those who historically benefit in Hartford’s particular landscape, at the expense of those who are 
most marginalized. Put another way, the public-private partnership simply injected economic 
power and risk into the community, which fell neatly along existing lines of spatial inequality. 
This means that Hartford’s specific relationship with its constituents and the state of Connecticut 
essentially predetermined the outcome of the stadium and the rest of DoNo. These relationships 
make it difficult to be optimistic about the ability of financial instruments to overcome these 
barriers and provide real, meaningful development for Hartford. This is not to say that Hartford 
is hopeless or that financing can never be a useful tool for redevelopment. This work instead 
proposes that local landscapes hold the key to understanding the efficacy of financing 
arrangements, and that more attention should be paid to understanding local contexts before a 
city commits to a public-private partnership or finance-based redevelopment project. 
 
Why I Study Hartford (and Why Others Should As Well) 
 Hartford stands as Connecticut’s capital city, but one living outside of the state might not 
know that. On the list of fun, interesting Northeastern capital cities, one likely will not list 
Hartford. Just take it from former Governor Dannel Malloy’s spokesperson, when making a pick 
for Amazon HQ to locate in Connecticut back in 2017.  She states, “situated between New York 
and Boston, home to great schools and world-class universities, and boasting a high quality of 
Steeves 13 
life, Connecticut would be a great home for a second Amazon headquarters” (Singer 2017). 
From this quote, one might gather that the best thing about Connecticut is not its own cities, but 
its strategic positionality amongst others. Mayor Luke Bronin, in his pitch, referred to Hartford 
as a “nice corridor,” again evoking the idea that the city’s best quality is essentially being 
pathway to somewhere else (Singer 2017). Putting its lack of flare aside, Hartford is also far 
smaller than many other Northeastern cities, with a total population of 122,105 people (United 
States Census Bureau 2019a). This dwarfs in comparison to the 692,600 people living in Boston 
and 179,883 people living in Providence, the capital city of the smallest state in the country 
(United States Census Bureau 2019d,e).  
 Despite being smaller and less memorable than other cities, Hartford is extremely 
complex. For example, Hartford’s skyline is adorned by an impressive golden-domed capitol 
building nestled in between high-rise office complexes. These buildings house the many white-
collar workers who commute into Hartford’s insurance and finance cluster, which is one of the 
largest in the country. Meanwhile, thirty percent of Hartford residents live below the federal 
poverty line (United States Census Bureau 2019b). To put that into perspective, about one out of 
every three people living in the city makes less than $12,760 a year (based on per capita income). 
In comparison, the poverty rate reported in Connecticut and the United States in 2019 both 
hovered around 10% (United States Census Bureau 2019a). This economic disparity has 
manifested itself within the structure of the city. Hartford has a violent crime rate of 10.92 per 
1,000 people, almost 8 points higher than the state average (Neighbor Scout 2020). A person in 
Connecticut, on average, has a 1 in 482 chance of becoming a victim of a violent crime, step into 
Hartford and those odds become 1 in 93 (Neighbor Scout 2020). Hartford very much is a tale of 
two cities, except both realities exist within the same municipal boundary.  
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 Overall, Hartford serves as the case study for this work because its spatial division 
provides an interesting window into understanding how gentrification, segregation, and 
regionalism are entangled with urban finance. Additionally, Hartford’s use of and, in fact, its 
reliance on financial instruments speaks to why more research is needed on this topic. As a poor 
city with much to lose, Hartford finds itself enmeshed in financial markets that heavily affect the 
city’s present and future. It is the small, relatively unknown cities that struggle most with 
attracting customers and investors alike. This means they are the most likely to risk and, 
unfortunately, most likely to lose. In this way, the benefits of studying Hartford are twofold. 
First, this work offers to Hartford theoretical frameworks and academic discourse that it has not 
previously been privy to in a substantial manner. Second, it calls for the increased need and 
reward of studying smaller, often overlooked cities.  
 
Theory and Methods, and A Note on Positionality  
 This work adds to the growing body of literature on post-industrial development. To do 
so, it builds a theoretical framework, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This 
framework delves deeper into the grounded urban experiences of the post-industrial city and how 
financial markets affect the landscape. The framework consists of four main pillars. The first is 
neoliberalism. I explore how municipalities respond to and internalize neoliberal ideology. This 
gives language to this work’s emphasis on specific urban contexts. Next, I track the rise of 
financialization within the city and, in particular, the advent of the public-private partnership. 
This discussion provides insight into the precarity of financial markets in municipal settings. 
Then, I shift to stadiums. In summarizing the literature on stadiums, I situate Hartford’s proposal 
amongst general theory, particularly regarding the costs and benefits of stadium builds. The final 
pillar is gentrification. I discuss how gentrification inevitably arises in the post-industrial city and 
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how city policies actually encourage it. Combined, these four pillars provide the foundation for 
this work’s exploration into the Downtown North Redevelopment Project.  
I also borrow from the fantastic local news sources and residents diligently engaged in 
discourse surrounding the project. This information is critical to understanding Hartford’s spatial 
inequality and current landscape. Whenever possible, primary sources are used to understand 
both the factual information regarding the city and the motivations of different actors. For 
example, the work includes quotations directly from planning documents, public meetings, and 
press releases regarding DoNo. The Hartford Courant and other local newspapers help to fill in 
the gaps, providing additional information about the timeline and execution of Downtown 
North’s redevelopment. Additionally, this work uses historic articles and excerpts to piece 
together the city’s long and complex history.  
At this time, it is important to acknowledge my own positionality as the author of this 
work. For twenty years, I lived in Southington, CT, a suburb of Hartford that is approximately a 
thirty minute drive from Dunkin Donuts Stadium. As a kid, my memories of the city are of 
pointing out the golden-domed state building on road trips and hearing stories from my parents, 
who once called Hartford home. In many ways, the city’s reputation as a place of poverty and 
violence precedes it. There exists almost an unspoken, but nonetheless agreed upon 
understanding of what Hartford is among its residents. Unfortunately, the narrative often stops 
there. As a long time resident of the area, I became interested in delving deeper into 
understanding Hartford’s spatial landscape, in hopes of adding complexity to the all too simple 
and unkind narrative. As will become apparent by the end of Chapter 3, residents in Hartford 
often are spoken over and generalized. Because of this, I attempt to tread carefully and 
respectfully into a discussion of the systemic problems in Hartford. It is a fundamental goal of 
this work to let the voices of Hartford’s historically silenced residents shine through and guide 
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this narrative. This is why each chapter title includes a quote from either a Hartford resident or 
Mayor Segarra because, really, this is their project.  
 
Chapter Outline 
From here, the work will proceed as described below.  
The next chapter constructs the theoretical framework used to analyze the DoNo’s 
financing agreement. To do so, focuses on the four pillars mentioned above: neoliberalism, 
financialization, stadiums, and gentrification. This provides readers first with a rudimentary 
understanding of how theorists are thinking about these issues. More importantly, the framework 
gives this work the tools and language to articulate its central argument regarding Hartford’s 
financial agreement.  
Chapter 2 explores Hartford’s spatial inequality. I provide a historical analysis of the 
many social, political, and economic factors that led Hartford to being one of the most racially 
and economically ostracized communities in the state. Understanding Hartford’s landscape of 
inequality is critical to the work because these equalities provide the basis for, and determine, I 
argue, the outcome of DoNo’s financing arrangement.  
Chapter 4 synthesizes the previous two sections. The chapter analyzes the financing of 
DoNo’s first build. In exploring the creation of and fallout from Hartford’s bond agreement, I 
demonstrate how DoNo’s financing first exposed and then threatened to widen the city’s unequal 
landscape. Finally, I look at DoNo in 2021. I argue that DoNo’s current predicament proves the 
ineffectiveness of the bond agreement at enacting real change. However, this work also looks at 
DoNo’s most recent iteration which, in some ways, pays closer attention to Hartford’s landscape.  
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Chapter 5 reiterates the main points of this work and why they remain important topics of 
study and exploration by urban governments. I leave off with a discussion of potential solutions 
























“We are Comfortable that this is a Reasonable Plan”: Theoretical Framework for 
Understanding Post-Industrial Urban Finance 
 
 Post-industrial cities across the United States exist in spatially, culturally, and 
economically complex arrangements. This work argues that these arrangements provide crucial 
insight into determining the outcome and feasibility of development projects. Before exploring 
Hartford’s case, an orientation into the theoretical conceptualizations of the post-industrial city 
proves helpful. Many scholars engage critically with the post-industrial city and the 
compounding effects of neoliberalism, financialization, stadium builds, and gentrification on the 
urban landscape. Their work underpins this one. 
This chapter puts a few of these urban theorists in conversation with each other. From 
this conversation emerges a framework for interrogating development projects and the role of the 
private sector across urban landscapes. First, this work first explores how to contextualize the 
vast differences in lived experience felt by post-industrial cities under a regime of neoliberalism. 
This leads to a discussion of financialization and the rise of the futures market in the urban 
economy. Next, I explore the nature of the post-industrial development project, particularly the 
stadium. Finally, the work looks at one of the most profound effects of financialization and post-
industrial development: gentrification.  
 
The Blurring of Public and Private: Neoliberalization and the Rise of Financialization 
 Neoliberalism serves as a fundamental ideology in American political and economic 
policy. Traditionally speaking, neoliberal policy argues for a reliance on free markets with a 
retrenchment of state and national governance (Brenner and Theodore 2013, 2). The United 
States adopted these policies in earnest under the leadership of Ronald Reagan (Monbiot 2016). 
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These policies included privatization, large tax cuts for the wealthy, and outsourcing of many 
manufacturing industries (Monbiot 2016). The combination of outsourced manufacturing and a 
lack of governmental aid left cities that once boomed with industry literally and figuratively in 
the black. These cities are haunted by their past, in name and in landscape.  
While this narrative remains generally true, it offers a simplistic story of the urban 
economy and landscape. Many scholars, particularly Brenner, Theodore, and Smith, complicate 
the traditional narrative of urban neoliberalism. In its place, they offer a nuanced understanding 
of how neoliberal ideology embeds itself within urban logics, which proves useful to this work’s 
inquiry.  
 Brenner and Theodore reconsider the hegemony of neoliberalism as a policy description. 
The authors argue that places cannot adequately be defined as either neoliberal or not, but instead 
find themselves along a continuum of neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 6). From 
this, posit that any intellectual project focusing on neoliberalism must be attentive to the ways in 
which societies evolve and bend towards neoliberal ideology. They find it more useful to think of 
neoliberalism as a process, rather than a static ideology. Going further, the work draws attention 
to the fact that neoliberal policy does necessarily juxtapose governmental policy (Brenner and 
Theodore 2003, 6). Instead, the authors argue that unwinding the complexities of neoliberal 
spaces means looking at the ways in which institutions have been changed by and to make way 
for international capital and other forms of neoliberal policy (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 16). 
The vocabulary of neoliberalization allows for a careful look at how cities’ own structures meld 
with neoliberal ideologies. In Hartford, the creation of the Stadium Authority serves as a primary 
example. 
Additionally, they note that neoliberalism is path-dependent, meaning neoliberal 
landscapes cannot be generalized (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 14). This negates the notion that 
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neoliberal policies look the same across all urban spaces. Instead, Brenner and Theodore argue 
for a localized, spatially attentive analysis of neoliberal space, which they call actually existing 
neoliberalism. Actually existing neoliberalism focuses on the particular arrangements of a city 
and how they have been altered by neoliberal policies. In essence, this concept forms the 
backbone of this work: that local contexts matter. My argument assumes that cities exist in a 
state of actually existing neoliberalism, which informs the detailed discussion of Hartford’s 
landscape. The work springboards off this concept to argue that local contexts not only matter, 
but also greatly inform urban futures, especially when using financial instruments.  
Brenner and Theodore also view urban spaces as “laboratories” for neoliberal policies 
(Brenner and Theodore 2003, 21). This means that cities exist as nodes of creation, not as simply 
reactionaries to federal mandates. Smith’s work agrees with this assessment. Smith argues that 
the urban economy is rising in prominence, while the national economy becomes increasingly 
less defined (Smith 2003, 83). This shift, which Smith and others refer to as new urbanism, 
necessitates a more nuanced framework for examining the power of cities. Smith notes that 
usually spaces become “global cities” when they perform a certain level of function for the 
global economy, such as New York City with finance. However, Smith argues that cities acting 
within neoliberal new urbanism necessarily interact with the global economy, making them 
inherently global cities (Smith 2003, 90). They do so to generate revenue and stoke capital 
surplus and social reproduction. Taken together, these works emphasize that the urban economy 
has become increasingly independent and entrepreneurial, and exist as distinct from state and 
federal economies.  
This framing underscores the importance of the public-private partnership (PPP), a 
common occurrence in the post-industrial city and the arrangement for Hartford’s DoNo project. 
PPPs became popular because of neoliberal policies that made traditional streams of revenue 
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unavailable to cities. Struggling post-industrial cities, now forced to act entrepreneurially and in 
need of redevelopment, turned to the private sector. From this, the PPP was born. PPPs blend 
financial markets and political institutions to actualize redevelopment projects. Scholars refer to 
this blurring as financialization (Weber 2010). Financialization changed how municipalities 
function and balance their budgets. It also serves as the primary interest of this work. 
Understanding the mechanisms behind municipal finance, especially the PPP, and its effects 
remain critical to the crux of this work’s argument.  
PPPs exist in a variety of forms. Hartford used bonds for the stadium, other areas use tax-
incremental finance or leasing agreements. Cities create unique arrangements to leverage their 
assets for development. At their core, these arrangements rely on the same principle: the time 
value of money. As Weber describes, the time value of money essentially is the principle that 
any amount of money one has now will be worth more in the future because of interest (Weber 
2020). This means that for those paying for redevelopment upfront, the investors, the future is 
where they make their money. This makes the future of the city of the utmost importance to 
investors and at the forefront of any PPP.   
Weber’s older, but aptly titled article “Selling City Futures: The Financialization of 
Urban Redevelopment Policy” explores the risks involved in PPP arrangements. First, the less 
financially secure a city is to begin with, the more risk they must assume attracting investors. As 
Weber explains, cash-strapped cities with poor credit and a worse economic reputation must 
prove their worthiness to investors in order to fund projects that the city hopes will increase 
revenue, but that they simply cannot afford without financial schemes (Weber 2010, 252). As a 
result, these cities often are forced to accept less than ideal contracts with investors, usually 
including high interest rates and other municipal burdens (Weber 2010, 252). Doing so makes 
them more attractive to investors, who will cash in off of higher interest payments. This 
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illustrates that a city’s prior economic landscape remains fundamental to evaluating the success 
of the project, as will be seen in Hartford.  
Additionally, Weber also explores three specific types of risk associated with 
financialization, all of which arise from specific local situations amplified by the injection of 
capital. The first risk is completion risk. This refers to the risk incurred if a project is never 
completed (Weber 2020). This poses problems for municipalities because it means they lose out 
on the proposed development and, depending on the financial arrangement, might be left in a 
worse economic situation (Weber 2020). Valuation risk is the second worry. Once a project 
reaches completion, the valuation of the land might fluctuate, causing instability in local real 
estate markets. Relatedly, the third risk is tax-related. This is the idea that a completed project 
will alter the way the city taxes their properties, again introducing instability into the market 
(Weber 2020). Overall, Weber illustrates that financialization comes with some opportunities, 
but also profound risks not equally felt across cities. Weber’s work underpins mine in that it 
draws attention to the division of risk and reward in urban development projects, and how local 
landscapes affect such allocations.  
 
Stadiums: A Common Post-Industrial Solution 
 Some cities, including Hartford, use PPPs to build sports stadiums in an attempt to solve 
their post-industrial economic crises. A discussion of the literature regarding the intended 
purposes and actual consequences of stadium-fueled development frames this work’s discussion 
of DoNo. According to the literature, stadiums become popular urban solutions for a number of 
reasons. Put nicely by Ahlfedt and Maennig, stadiums act as iconic architecture for urban spaces, 
meaning their structures stand as distinct across the cityscape (Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2010, 630). 
The building of a stadium makes a space visually unique. It provides the city with a landmark, 
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which in turn adds to the city’s identity, legibility, and branding, which are all important traits in 
the post-industrial city. Stadiums become a site to see and a symbol of the city (Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig 2010, 630). This is important in the post-industrial city where consumption itself is the 
product. This consumption has the limiting factor of time. While a person might purchase many 
different products that are alike, a person usually chooses to visit locations that they deem 
interesting and unique because the time they spend at these places is also valuable to them. 
Sports stadiums, which are interesting and unique, provide that edge to municipalities, acting as 
anchor institutions to spark local tourism. This makes them, in theory, good investments for the 
post-industrial city.  
The implementation of stadiums remains more complicated. Many authors argue that the 
particular landscape of a city heavily influences the outcome of the stadium. First, local politics 
play an important role in determining where stadiums get built. In a study examining the 
outcomes of PPPs to build sports stadiums, Delaney and Eckstein arrive at a framework for 
understanding the popularity of the particular build. The authors argue that the presence of a 
growth coalition in cities strongly determines whether or not a stadium will be proposed and 
built (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). They define growth coalitions as a consortium of public 
officials, private interests, and even the media, promoting the feasibility of the project and 
convincing locals to get on board (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). In practice, these actors work to 
champion governmental and resident support for a stadium. They add fervor to the project, which 
makes its construction more likely.  
Other authors argue that local contexts matter not only in the location of stadiums, but in 
their ability to positively impact an area. Generally, stadium literature agrees that they are not 
effective development agents. For example, Delaney and Eckstein summarize many empirical 
studies that all conclude that the costs often outweigh the benefits for stadiums (Delaney and 
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Eckstein 2007). They themselves state that sports stadiums provide initial increases in 
consumption, known as the honeymoon phase, but fail to deliver long term consumer and 
governmental surplus (Delany and Eckstein 2007). Ahlfeldt and Maennig agree that there exists 
little empirical evidence to support the claim that stadiums’ iconic architecture provides a greater 
level of economic growth to a city (Ahlfedlt and Maennig 2010).  
However, some authors are not willing to completely disregard the feasibility of the 
stadium as a tool for economic development. They stipulate that, in order for stadiums to be 
successful, more attention must be paid to the politics of the planning and financing of the 
stadiums. For example, Chema argues that the success of a baseball stadium depends on its 
integration within the urban fabric (Chema 1996). He notes that stadiums that are more 
connected to the central metropolitan area of a city are more likely to achieve positive economic 
results (Chema 1996). Doing so, he argues, requires a complex look at the city’s demographics 
and economic patterns. Similarly, Irizarry posits that stadiums have the ability to provide 
economic growth if they are properly financed. For this to happen, she argues, the entity with the 
most economic power should bear the most risk in the private-public partnership (Irizarry 2017). 
This would be the developers, investors, or sports franchises themselves. This way, if a problem 
arises from the construction or operation of the stadium, the risk bearing entity has the capital to 
create solutions or at least avoid economic ruin. However, as Irizarry states, this usually is not 
the case. Most often, cities themselves are responsible for assuming the risk of the stadium, 
meaning they are financially responsible for any potential shortcomings in the stadium’s ability 
to pay for itself (Irizarry 2017). To determine which party can shoulder more risk requires a 
deeper look into the details of each entity, including the municipality, financing instrument, and 
private company.  
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Overall, Hartford’s reliance on a baseball stadium to catalyze development in the 
Downtown North region fell into many of the traps seen above. The rhetoric employed by Mayor 
Segarra, the developers, and baseball executives emphasized the project’s ability to create 
revenue. This might have been true under different circumstances. However, The city simply did 
not pay close enough attention to its economic and social situations, as authors above instruct, 
leading the project to join the long list of stadiums financed by desperate municipalities that did 
not pay off.  
 
The Effects of Stadiums and Similar Projects on the Urban Landscape 
 Oftentimes, stadiums gentrify. In fact, post-industrial cities commonly struggle with 
gentrification. Broadly, gentrification refers to the changing characteristics of neighborhoods due 
to a migration of new, usually wealthier people into the area (Smith 2003, 91). These people 
become attracted to the new amenities, such as a stadium, housing complex, or Main Street 
revitalization. Their increased presence in the area often leads to increased housing and food 
prices and demographic changes. While gentrification as a practice is not new, Smith notes that it 
was previously seen as sporadic and really a side effect of urban redevelopment projects (Smith 
2003, 93). During the 1990s, this began to change. With the increasingly neoliberal atmosphere 
and newfound competitive nature of urban space, gentrification became, and continues to be, 
central to urban revitalization (Smith 2003, 93). Smith describes this as gentrification being 
“generalized” into the urban fold (Smith 2003, 99). This means that cities, in a way, intend to 
gentrify. 
By centralizing policies that intend to gentrify, cities accomplish two goals. First, 
capitalizing on the new wealth in the area gives cities access to the revenues needed to fill the 
gaps left by a lack of state and federal funding (Smith 2003, 99). Additionally, this income 
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becomes a source of productive capital for the city, making it better equipped to act as a site of 
global production (Smith 2003, 99). In this way, gentrification and urban renewal act both as a 
response to the neoliberal atmosphere and perpetuates it. Cities with factories and production 
facilities that lay dormant after deindustrialization must turn to the production of consumption to 
balance their budgets and stay relevant. This is why gentrification necessarily comes with urban 
renewal, because cities can no longer make money from selling rich people products, now done 
cheaper  elsewhere. Instead they must entice wealthy people to come and spend money in their 
economy. To keep up, cities tailor their landscapes and policies to facilitate this new, 
gentrification based economy, making it no longer a side effect, but a goal, of redevelopment.  
 The scholarship of Richard Florida provides context for how gentrification becomes 
generalized. Florida argues that the key to sustained urban economic growth lies in the ability of 
a city to attract the creative class (Florida 2014, 197). According to Florida, the creative class, 
such as artists, tech workers, and entrepreneurs, fuel economic growth through their spending 
power (Florida 2014, 197). These are the people most likely to cluster in urban spaces, so cities 
must grow their amenity base to attract their talent before it goes elsewhere (Florida 2014, 198). 
To accomplish this, Florida argues that cities must focus on three factors: technology, tolerance, 
and talent (Florida 2014, 198). For Florida, the recipe for creating a solid economy means 
creating an interesting, fun place to live for educated, wealthy people, and providing them the 
means to make a living and spend their money in the city. Practically, this translates into cities 
catering to a class of people that do not currently live there. Cities must alter their landscapes, 
and the gentrifying class will move in and increase revenues, so says Florida. Many cities 
following Florida’s advice now contend with the resulting gentrification. One Guardian article 
from 2017 refers to him as “the ultimate champion of gentrification (Wainwright 2017). A key 
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takeaway from Florida’s suggestions is that cities, under his advice, must  prioritize their 
attention for different groups of people based on their spending power.  
 These theories underpin the latter section of this work’s argument. Financialization and 
gentrification are closely related because they rely on the same principle: the future. The private 
sector depends on cities building a more profitable future to be able to secure a return on their 
investments. Gentrification provides a viable way to envision a wealthier future, through the 
creative class. Reading Smith and Florida’s work calls upon readers to examine how post-
industrial cities inherently promote gentrifying policies for these ends. This gives this work the 
language to argue that Hartford’s financing agreement for the baseball stadium committed 
Hartford to produce a more profitable future, through the rest of DoNo, and to understand how 
that future further divides the city.  
 
Conclusion 
 The literature discussed above provides this work with a foundation for understanding 
how stadium-finance perpetuates inequality in Hartford. The theorists add nuance to traditional 
understandings of post-industrial cities, and they call for added emphasis into the particular 
spatial arrangements of cities, their institutions, and residents.  Additionally, we learn that from 
these financial arrangements emerges the likelihood of gentrification, which can further 
exacerbate spatial inequalities. From this, a framework emerges emphasizing that neoliberal 







“I Can’t Leave Hartford Because No One Wants to Buy My House”: Understanding the 
Landscape of Spatial Inequality in Hartford  
 
 In 1870, the New York Times named Hartford America’s richest city (Dougherty 2020). 
In 2021, it consistently ranks among the poorest (World Population Review 2021). Hartford’s 
fall from economic grace tells a story of profound inequality, both within the city and between 
Hartford and surrounding municipalities. Hartford’s landscape of inequality derives from 
economic disparities across distinguished, persisting racial lines. Some census data helps to put 
this into perspective. Hartford itself is largely non-white. In 2019, 37.7% of the city identified as 
African American and 44.3% as Hispanic (United States Census Bureau 2019b,c). Only 31.3% 
of Hartford residents identified as white (United States Census Bureau 2019b). This starkly 
differs from the demographics of the cities surrounding Hartford. In Hartford County, 74.8% of 
people identify as being white (United States Census Bureau 2019c). African Americans and 
Hispanics make up 15.8% and 18% of the population, respectively (United States Census Bureau 
2019b,c). Ultimately, Hartford exists as an enclave for non-white people in the county. Tangible 
inequities associate themselves with this reality. The area median income in Connecticut 
generally is $75,148, in Hartford it is $36,278 (United States Census Bureau 2019a,b). Hartford’s 
area median income also declined more rapidly in the last three decades than it did in 
Connecticut generally. Additionally, Hartford residents tend to hold lower paying jobs, such as 
office and administrative support, healthcare support, and food preparation and service jobs at 
higher rates than their Hartford County counterparts (DataUSA).  
 These trends continue inside Hartford’s city line. While white people make up the 
minority in Hartford, they generally live with better means. The dissimilarity index proves useful 
in quantifying this divide. The index measures the relative unevenness between two groups and 
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is the most common measurement of segregation and unequal opportunity (Eaton 2020, 7). With 
a rating of 1 being entirely unequal between white people and other groups, Hispanics in 
Hartford were given a score of .62 and Black people a score of .71 (Eaton 2020, 7). This 
illustrates that the minority groups lead fairly distinct, unequal, lives from white people in 
Hartford. These inequities also manifest across space. The North End of Hartford tends to have 
higher percentages of Black residents, while the South End tends to house more of the Hispanic 
population (MAGIC 2012). This creates a very clear racial divide across the city.  
 Harford’s spatial inequality did not happen overnight. Multiple actors, institutions, and 
policies conditioned the city through centuries of racialized, political, and neoliberal processes 
that cultivated in Hartford’s racially segregated and economically clustered neighborhoods. This 
chapter explores the making of this landscape. In doing so, this chapter examines three distinct 
periods in the city’s history: the rise of industry, selective deindustrialization, and the making of 
a post-industrial city. Each section demonstrates the ways in which policies motivated by 
capitalism and racism worked together to produce Hartford’s landscape. This chapter provides 
necessary context for understanding how the North End of Hartford emerged from the 2000’s as 
a primarily Black and under-resourced enclave in a minority-majority and under-resourced city. 
Analyzing the building of this landscape remains crucial to the next chapter's discussion of how 
DoNo finances inequality across these very lines. 
 
The Rise of Industry and Spatial Division 
 While there exists no official start date for the beginning of Hartford’s unequal, racialized 
landscapes, 1614 is a good place to start. For centuries prior, the Eastern Pequot Tribal Nation 
called the area that would one day be called Hartford home (CT State Library 2017). In 1614, the 
first Europeans, Dutch traders, stepped foot in future Hartford (CT State Library 2017). This 
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marked the beginning of a centuries long, horrible genocide that succeeded in robbing the Pequot 
of their land and autonomy. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the land had fully been 
transformed from an indigenous homeland to a seat of white, American enterprise. Presently, the 
Eastern Pequot Tribal Nation retains only a small swath of land, on a reservation in North 
Stonington, Connecticut (Jackson 2020). The decline of native populations in the area signals 
Hartford’s first attempts at segregating minority communities and depriving them of resources. 
This would become a pattern.  
 Hartford’s enterprise consisted of two distinct industrial clusters: insurance and 
manufacturing. The city’s tale of two industries transformed Hartford’s physical and economic 
landscapes, creating the inequalities still seen today. Insurance began in Hartford first. Given its 
strategic position along the Connecticut River, Hartford existed as a landscape of flux, with 
traders and sailors of all sorts gathering in the city’s local taverns and inns to rest (Woodward 
1879, 1). Within these gatherings, a desire to protect maritime cargo and voyages arose. Acting 
on these desires, sailors began informal underwriting around the middle of the eighteenth century 
(Woodward 1879, 10). In these rudimentary agreements, sailors would come together and agree 
to share both the risks and rewards of each other's voyages to minimize individual risk.  
 Local entrepreneurs formalized this activity as a lucrative career in the late eighteen 
hundreds. The openings of Hartford and Union Banks in 1792 facilitated this by providing local 
underwriters formal lines of financing and capital (Woodward 1). This actually marks Hartford’s 
first entanglement with financial markets, which would, again, become a greater pattern in the 
city. As a result of these formal institutions, the years following 1792 saw informal and formal 
underwriting accelerate in popularity, given the ease and legitimacy with which people could 
join the field. Throughout the 1800s, Hartford’s insurance industry expanded into a powerful 
cluster. Companies, such as Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance, moved to the region, while 
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existing companies expanded their insurance markets, eventually including fire, health and life 
insurance (Woodward 1879, 118). Through an artful handling of multiple crises, including an 
embargo on foreign goods in 1807 (Baranoff) and the New York City Fires between 1835-1845, 
the insurance companies of Hartford proved their resilience and staying power (Woodward 1879, 
119). By the end of the century, Hartford became synonymous with insurance (Mahoney 2015).  
 As Hartford’s insurance sector continued to prosper, the city began to develop a diverse 
manufacturing cluster. The onset of the Civil War thrust Hartford into the industrial spotlight. 
The Samuel Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company was the first factory to open its doors 
in Hartford in 1855 (Baics 2001, 50). Transitioning from the national war effort to the Industrial 
Revolution, factories continued to crop up across the city. By 1880, more than 800 factories 
dotted Hartford’s landscape (Baics 2001, 50). They produced everything from sewing machines 
to bicycles to bottles of vodka, making Hartford’s industrial portfolio incredibly diverse (Swift 
1995). Weed Sewing Machine, Pope Manufacturing, Pratt & Whitney Machine Tools, and 
Underwood Typewriter are just a few of the companies that called Hartford home during its 
industrial era (Ryan 1996). The cluster’s diversity of production gave it power and stability 
throughout the century. The combined riches from insurance and manufacturing won Hartford 
the title of America’s richest city in the 1870s (Dougherty 2020).  
 In spite of the immense wealth generated in Hartford, its citizens did not equally 
experience the spoils of industry. The turn of the century (1870-1930), proved to be a pivotal 
period for creating and cementing inequalities that would persist indefinitely in the city. During 
that period, Hartford witnessed a profound shift in demographics due to available manufacturing 
jobs. First, European and Russian workers filled these ranks. In the coming years, Hartford’s 
foreign born population exponentially increased with the arrival of Irish, Italian, German, 
Swedish, and many other European citizens (Baics 2001, 51). Census data from the 1890s 
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illustrate that these populations, who at the time were still predominantly white, usually resided 
on Hartford’s East Side (Baics 2001, 51). The foreign population on the East Side continued to 
expand in the coming decades, becoming known as the city’s foreign quarter (Baics 2001, 58).  
Residents of the foreign quarter experienced awful conditions. They lived in incredibly crowded 
and ill-maintained tenements, with 14.8 people per dwelling at its worst (Baics 2001, 58). As 
unskilled, foreign born, and poor, this population was sequestered to the outskirts of the city and 
kept in far inferior conditions to the native, wealthier sections of Hartford. In this way, the East 
Side became one of Hartford’s first separate, but unequal, communities.  
 The city of Hartford’s desire and ability to segregate populations they deemed 
undesirable only increased in the twentieth century with an influx of Southern African 
Americans. The Great Migration, which began in 1910, brought Southern Black workers to 
Hartford in search of higher wages and job security provided by tobacco fields and industry jobs 
(Close 2013). Hartford businesses welcomed the migration, looking to fill their ranks with 
cheaper labor than what white, unionized workers could provide (Close 2013). At the time, 
African American workers earned 30-40% less than their white counterparts, while experiencing 
harsher working conditions in factories and farms (Thornton 2017). Despite capitalizing on their 
labor, white city of Hartford residents did not want these new immigrants living amongst them. 
According to Lewis, Hartford residents associated Southern Black people with crime and 
misconduct (Lewis 1999). Generally, Black people born and socialized in the North received less 
spite (Lewis 1999). This led to Black immigrants locating on the East Side, in the city’s pre-
existing ghetto, or on the outskirts of Hartford where housing was the cheapest (Tuckel et.al 
2007, 718).  
 Soon after, the city of Hartford and surrounding towns launched several initiatives to 
relocate Black residents out of the suburbs and traditionally white neighborhoods to the North 
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End. For example, 1924 saw West Hartford, a wealthy suburb of Hartford, enact the area’s first 
municipal zoning law (Dougherty 2020). This ordinance mandated that two-family homes only 
be built if sat on a particular amount of land (Dougherty 2020). In subtext, this law essentially 
made building multi-family homes largely unrealistic in West Hartford due to the land 
requirement. This meant that lower class families, who usually could only afford to live in such 
arrangements, would be confined to the city of Hartford itself. Ordinances like these, tasked with 
keeping cities “orderly,” continued throughout the early nineteen hundreds (Dougherty 2020). 
Additionally, the city of Hartford used scare tactics, such as rising taxes, threat of foreclosure, 
and demanding proof of occupancy to remove Black tenants from Hartford’s southern, and at the 
time, whiter, neighborhoods (Tuckel et.al 2007, 715).  
The city also practiced more explicit forms of segregation, such as blockbusting and 
redlining. During the 1930s and 1940s, banks routinely denied Black citizens mortgage loans 
(Dougherty 2020). If given the ability to buy a home, Black citizens were required to do so in 
certain sections of town (Dougherty 2020). These policies culminated in Black residents being 
relegated largely to the North End by the middle of the century. Once there, slumlords took 
advantage of the already precarious situation these families faced. Poorly constructed and 
crowded housing complexes, much like the ones previously seen in the foreign quarter, started to 
arise (Close 2013). City policy allowed this to happen, and turned a blind eye to the safety and 
health issues arising from these living arrangements (Close 2013).  
When 1948 rang in the official end of redlining and blockbusting, made illegal by the 
federal government, the city of Hartford and surrounding areas no longer needed those tools 
(Dougherty 2020). Hartford’s suburban neighborhoods successfully pushed people of color into 
the city proper, while Hartford’s government further isolated them in the North End. This 
succeeded in creating a racialized ghetto within an already racialized city.  
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Selective Deindustrialization and Cementing Unequal Landscapes  
 The 1960’s ushered in a period of rapid transformation for many aspects of Hartford’s 
landscape. The combination of new political, economic, and social relations worked to create 
new institutions and geographies. This cemented some of the most fundamental divides present 
in the city. Paying particular attention to the compounding effects of shifting forms of capitalism 
and its entanglements with race, this section demonstrates how Hartford and surrounding areas 
continued to isolate and underserve the North End.  
 The most notable transition occurred within a greater current of economic change for the 
United States. Generally, manufacturing in the United States began to decline around the middle 
of the century. In Hartford, manufacturing jobs declined from its high of nearly 200,000 in 1950 
to just 20,000 by 1970 (Bisson 2016, 2). In the decades following 1970, the factories that once 
lined Hartford’s main streets grew empty and eventually fell to ruins. The closure of the Samuel 
Colt Factory in 1994 marked a symbolic end of this chapter of Hartford’s history (Julien 1994). 
Touted to be the oldest, fondest story of Connecticut manufacturing, even the gun factory could 
not afford to keep its roots in Hartford. By the end of the twentieth century, Most of Hartford’s 
middle class workers had lost their employment (Julien 1994). This was especially difficult given 
that many of those employed in the factories were Black and also received limited post-high 
school education, if any. In effect, deindustrialization worsened the position of already 
vulnerable populations in Hartford. Meanwhile, the insurance industry continued to thrive, as the 
United States economy transitioned mostly towards service. White collar workers continued to 
enjoy the job security and high salaries that came with these types of jobs (Bisson 2016, 3). This 
shift in employment opportunities reinforced the pre-existing economic divide. Those who 
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worked on the factory floor, low-skilled, foreign, and African Americans workers, lost their 
livelihoods while the white, wealthier residents retained their employment.  
 At the same time, the entire city of Hartford became racially, politically, and 
economically segregated from Hartford County during the last half of the twentieth century. 
During the 1970s in particular, Hartford experienced a dramatic wave of white flight (Bisson 
2016, 2). White flight refers to the movement of white, generally wealthy people to the outskirts 
or suburbs of an urban area. In Hartford, people often moved to the surrounding towns in 
Hartford County such as West Hartford, Avon, and Farmington. The motivations and means by 
which this transition occurred are worth analyzing because they helped to reinforce the 
ostracization of Hartford, and particularly the North End.  
First, the completion of two major highways, I-84 and I-91 in the 1970s, facilitated white 
flight (Department of Transportation). The highways made it far easier for those working in the 
city to commute in and out each day (Lis 2012). Additionally the Department of Transportation 
built an interchange between the two highways within Hartford (Department of Transportation). 
This interchange physically bisected the city, which created a tangible barrier between the North 
End and the rest of Hartford. The area just below the interchange is Hartford’s central business 
district. Most people who commute into Hartford head there. Just above the interchange is 
Downtown North, the area that would soon become a sea of parking lots due to disinvestment, 
and farther up, is the North End. The sea of parking lots exists as a physical manifestation of the 
damage of this interchange. People simply stopped coming to North Hartford. The highway 
routed commuters either through Hartford, or directly to the central business district (Department 
of Transportation). In effect, this highway prioritized the needs of commuters and Hartford's 
most profitable parts, such as those in the central business district, over the North End.  
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 Secondly, the codification of a specific Connecticut phenomena, known as home rule, 
greatly exacerbated the effects of white flight. Home rule mandates that Connecticut towns be 
responsible for their own services and budgets, instead of a county government (Diller 2017, 1). 
This system officially began in 1960 with the abolishment of the county government system 
(Diller 2017, 2). Connecticut legislators dissolved county governments because they were seen 
as redundant, given that many municipalities already preferred the home rule system. Previously, 
county governments were able to collect county taxes, similar to state taxes, and share sales tax 
revenue across municipalities (Watson 1998). After 1960, however, municipalities remained 
wholly responsible for raising their own capital. This left the city of Hartford, already struggling 
with white flight and deindustrialization, to fend for itself financially without the help of its 
wealthier suburbs in Hartford County. Not only did this reinforce current inequities, but also 
created an economic need for Hartford to engage with the private sector and financial markets to 
make up the difference.  
 Overall, the last decades of the twentieth century strengthened the spatial divides within 
and around Hartford. These policies, while less overtly discriminatory than the ones discussed in 
the previous section, nonetheless helped to maintain the status quo of inequality surrounding 
Hartford and the North End.  
 
The Making of the Post-Industrial City: Hartford Today  
 During the 1970s and 1980s, Hartford made its first attempts at recovery from the post-
industrial fallout. The city engaged in urban renewal, a specific brand of redevelopment 
employed during this period. Broadly, urban renewal used federal funds and eminent domain to 
remake the less picturesque parts of cities in an attempt to boost the economy and keep cities 
from falling to ruins (Gans 1965). However, many urban renewal projects have come to be seen 
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as failures (Gans 1965). In Hartford specifically, they often exacerbated economic and racial 
issues within the city. Although Hartford became increasingly more diverse in population by the 
year, insurance CEOs and bank executives held most of the power during the urban renewal age. 
In fact, they created a group known as “the Bishops,” that set the agenda for urban renewal 
projects (Gosselin 2017). The Bishops’ hoped to rebuild the downtown area, but only to suit their 
needs as heads of important industries in Hartford. They schemed to develop only the major 
corridors of the city, such as the Main Street in the Downtown area (Flanagan 2018, 20). 
Additionally, they sought to isolate Puerto Rican and other ethnic minorities from these 
redeveloped areas (Flanagan 2018, 20).  
 The Hartford Civic Center exists as the first and most iconic example of selective urban 
renewal in the city. The project was spearheaded by Aetna, a large insurance company located in 
Hartford. Some referred to the company as “Mother Aetna” during the Bishop era because of 
how influential its executives were on Hartford’s redevelopment (Gosselin 2017). The Civic 
Center opened in 1975 primarily as a sports arena for the Hartford Whalers, but also held a  
variety of events (Gosselin 2017). The Civic Center intended to generate revenue and cultural 
significance for Hartford’s downtown region through entertainment and sports, another trend in 
Hartford’s development history. However, this first attempt fell short. In 1978, the roof of the 
Civic Center collapsed, leaving the building unusable for two years (Gosselin 2017). The Civic 
Center project is emblematic of this era of Hartford’s development for a few reasons. First, the 
blatant exclusion of minority groups from the planning and benefits of redevelopment speaks to 
the continued spatial inequities in Hartford. Second, the role of the “Bishops” demonstrates 
Hartford’s continued prioritization of wealthier individuals. Finally, the collapse of the roof is 
symbolic of the structure issues present within Hartford that rendered the Civic Center poorly 
constructed and ineffective.  
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 In the twenty-first century, the city continued to try out a creative economy approach, as 
prescribed by Florida. The city attempted to attract sports teams with new facilities. For example, 
the city, along with help from the Connecticut State Bond Commission and the Regional 
Development Authority, opened Rentschler Field  and Dillion Stadium all in the 2010s  
(Gosselin 2017) (Cooper 2019). Using these agencies meant that Hartford alone did not shoulder 
the burden of redevelopment, but, in exchange, they did not own the properties. With these 
projects, Hartford’s insurance and financial executives did not play large roles. This is because 
Hartford’s insurance cluster weakened during this time. For example, The Connecticut Mutual 
Life Insurance Company merged with MutualMass in 1996, and moved its headquarters to 
Springfield, Massachusetts (Stowe 2003). Travelers Insurance Company merged with St. Paul 
Companies in 2002 to be headquartered in St. Paul (Stowe 2003). Even Aetna, once the kingpin 
of Hartford’s service sector, has threatened to leave Hartford (Gosselin 2017). This meant that 
wealthy businesses no longer exist as sources of funding for economic development.  
 Hartford’s history of inequalities leaves the city in a vulnerable economic position and 
leaves limited options for funding its own redevelopment. White flight and a culture of 
commuting continue to wreak havoc on Hartford’s tax base. In a 2016 study, researchers found 
that over 80% of people working in Hartford commute in, meaning they do not live in the city 
(Flanagan 2018, 11). The average wage of a commuter is $80,000 (Flanagan 2018, 11). 
Meanwhile, those who commute out of the city for work earn a mere $40,000, illustrating a clear 
discrepancy between workers from the city and workers from the suburbs (Flanagan 2018, 11). 
This also gives an indication of the difference in income taxes collected in Hartford versus the 
surrounding suburbs. Additionally, Hartford continues to be short changed by the state’s 
Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) program. This program allows municipalities to recover 
some of its lost revenue from tax-exempt properties, which in Hartford, totals 60% of properties 
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(Flanagan 2018, 22). However, the state of Connecticut severely underfunds the program, 
resulting in more than $376 million dollars in losses between 2011 and 2018 (Pilon 2019). This 
clearly demonstrates the human and infrastructural disinvestment in Hartford via the state 
government. Taken together, it illustrates how little tax revenue Hartford earns. Taken together, 
these factors force the city to rely on state or regional networks of support, giving them 
administrative control over the construction and operation of the projects or turn to the private 
sector through PPPs.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, Hartford’s spatial inequalities resulted from centuries of deliberate 
segregation, economic restructuring, and political decisions. Together, these inequalities 
succeeded in converting the once richest city in the country, to one of the poorest and most 
segregated. Hartford’s prolonged economic turmoil guided Hartford to the private financial 
market for redevelopment support. Understanding the inequalities that precede them remains 












“We Can’t Afford a Stadium, Some of Us Can’t Even Afford a Home”: How the Financing 
of DoNo Manifests Across Hartford’s Divisions 
 
 The redevelopment of Hartford’s Downtown North Region provides an illustrative 
example of the effects of increased financialization on a spatially polarized city. This chapter 
examines the financing of the first stage of DoNo’s development and how the particulars of the 
deal mapped across Hartford’s landscape of inequality and, actually, sought to exacerbate it. 
First, the work will situate the financial plan for the construction of DoNo Phase I, the baseball 
stadium. Next, I will explore the noted ways in which the financing of the baseball stadium exists 
along preexisting fault lines of inter and intra-urban divisions. Then, I demonstrate how DoNo’s 
financing necessarily exacerbates social and economic inequality in Hartford. Finally, the 
chapter ends with a discussion of DoNo’s future and how the city’s reconceptualized plan might 
better deal with Hartford’s unique contexts. Overall, I argue that Hartford’s specific institutional, 
social, and economic arrangements prove to be important factors for how successful DoNo 
would become. Without paying attention to these contexts, Hartford’s public-private partnership 
simply finances inequality.  
 
Bonds and Baseball: An Analysis of DoNo’s Financing Arrangement  
 The Downtown North Redevelopment Project intends to convert six parcels of vacant 
land just North of Hartford’s highway interchange into over 1.5 million square feet of 
development (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). This development includes retail, office, 
and residential space (Planning and Zoning Commission 2008). The baseball stadium, now 
named Dunkin Donuts Stadium, anchors DoNo. It was the first project to be built and financed. 
On January 26, 2015, the city assembled the Hartford Stadium Authority, which received the 
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task of funding the construction and maintenance of the baseball stadium (Hartford City Council 
2015, 1). This arrangement is not uncommon for development projects in the state. Connecticut 
statutes allow municipalities to inaugurate public authorities to handle parks and other public 
projects (Connecticut General Statutes). With that responsibility, the group received the power to 
issue bonds and enter into agreements with developers, among other duties (Code of 
Ordinances). The group consists of five members, in which only one has been elected by the 
general population. That would be the City Treasurer, who is elected to a four year term. Also on 
the committee is the city’s Chief Operating Officer, who is appointed by the Mayor. The City 
Council appoints the other three representatives whose only prerequisites are to hold “a 
background or experience in the fields of law, finance, accounting, marketing or public relations, 
sports or recreation, and construction” (Code of Ordinances). The members do not have to be 
Hartford residents (Code of Ordinances). Finally, the President of the City Council and Mayor 
may attend meetings, but may not vote (Code of Ordinances).  
 The Stadium Authority chose to pay for the stadium with municipal bonds, specifically 
lease revenue bonds. Lease revenue bonds allow for an initial sum of money to be collected from 
bond sales to purchase a property (Howard 2020). The money garnered from increased revenues 
of the property will, in theory, cover the interest payments due on the bonds. In the case of 
Hartford, the Stadium Authority issued $62,450,000 worth of lease revenue bonds on February 
17, 2015 (DC Bonds 2015, 1). The bonds were issued with a 5% interest rate, meaning when the 
bonds were due, at their maturity date, the initial amount of the bond plus interest would be paid 
(DC Bonds 2015, 1). The bonds come to maturity in 2042, but buyers have the option to redeem 
the bonds in 2036 (DC Bonds 2015, 25). The bonds received an A+ rating, putting them in the 
upper-medium echelon according to the value of the bonds (DC Bonds 2015, 1). This means that 
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crediting agencies gave their approval that these bonds would be a good investment for investors, 
indicating their trust that Hartford would not default on interest payments. 
 This brings to light an important aspect of the bond deal: the relationship between the 
Stadium Authority and the city of Hartford. The Stadium Authority blurs the lines between 
private enterprise and public body. The Authority assumes full responsibility of creating and 
selling the bonds (Code of Ordinances). The debt does not count towards Hartford’s municipal 
debt, nor does it affect the city’s bond rating (Code of Ordinances). This gives the Authority a 
wide berth in terms of setting the parameters for the stadium’s financing. However, ultimately, 
the bond issuance must be voted on by the City Council (Code of Ordinances). The Council gave 
their approval in February 2015 via a simple majority vote (Stroller and Carlesso 2015). The 
bond issuance required a Council vote because the deal created financial responsibility for the 
city. The deal requires the city, not the Authority to pay approximately $4 million dollars a year 
in interest payments and other fees, including wages for lawyers and consultants, for 26 years 
(Haar 2015). Hartford planned to use increased sales and property taxes from the development to 
make these payments. However, the city remains obligated to make the payments regardless of 
the success of the stadium (DC Bonds 2015, 6). The city agreed to financial obligation because 
the city needed the capital for redevelopment. Once paid off, the Stadium Authority, which 
currently leases the property to Hartford, will transfer its ownership to the city (DC Bonds 2015, 
14). Once transformed, the city will be able to extract revenue and property tax from the stadium. 
 There existed really only one other option for Hartford to finance the stadium, given the 
city’s financial predicament. This would be a lease agreement between the developer and the 
city, instead of between the Stadium Authority and the city. In this arrangement, the developer, 
DoNo LLC, would purchase the property, and the city would pay annual lease payments to the 
developer. The city rejected this plan because it would cost approximately $22 million dollars 
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more in the long run than issuing municipal bonds (Haar 2015). The savings accumulate because 
municipalities can borrow at lower interest rates than private companies (Haar 2015). For a cash-
strapped city such as Hartford, savings like this matter. However, as will be discussed below, 
carrying the burden of increased debt obligations through the Stadium Authority left the city in 
an economically and socially precarious place.  
 
Exposing the Divisions: DoNo’s Financing Across a Cartography of Inequality 
 The issuance of bonds by the Stadium Authority preserved structures and practices that 
led to the North End being the most economically and socially disadvantaged section of the city 
and Hartford as one of the poorest municipalities in Connecticut. This occurred because the bond 
agreement did not take local contexts into account. Instead, the agreement simply injected the 
risks and rewards of finance across preexisting power relations.  
 The very first step in the financing process, the decision to create a public stadium 
authority to issue bonds, allowed the city to have access to a large amount of capital without 
involving the public. The city was able to issue the bonds through the Stadium Authority without 
the seal of approval from Hartford residents. This happened because Hartford's City Charter does 
not require a referendum vote for any type of bond issuance (City Charter 2002, 51). According 
to the “Official Statement” released by DC Bonds regarding Hartford Stadium Authority’s lease 
revenue bonds, under city charter bonds are issued only through a simple majority of City 
Council members (DC Bonds 2015, 63). As a result, the Stadium Authority had the ability to 
leverage large amounts of international capital without a public referendum. The public could 
only stop the issuance of the bonds if, within thirty days of the bonds issuance, a petition signed 
by three percent of the electorate is presented to the City Council, which would cause the city to 
issue a referendum on the bonds in the next election (DC Bonds 2015, 63). This option, however, 
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remained elusive and complicated. Given that it was never mentioned in the three public 
hearings regarding the project, citizens might not have even been aware of that part of the 
legislation. No matter the explanation, this effectively silenced Hartford residents. This is 
problematic because not only are Hartford residents, particularly North End residents, most 
directly affected by the stadium, all of Hartford remains responsible for the interest payments.  
 Had the issuance of bonds for the baseball stadium been put to a referendum, the 
project’s future likely would not have been so certain. Many residents passionately opposed 
DoNo and its accompanying baseball stadium and said so in their public statements during the 
hearings (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b,c,d). Some voiced concerns regarding the 
financing arrangement, which required the city of Hartford, and its taxpayers, to back the bonds 
in the event the revenue from the stadium could not cover the interest payments. Mrs. Tillman, 
for example, who likened Hartford to a toilet bowl without enough money to pay for toilet paper, 
points to a disconnect between Hartford’s expensive vision and whimpering wallet (Office of 
Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b,c,d). Others, who may not have explicitly named the financing as 
their main complaint, might have used the ballot as a referendum for the project as a whole. The 
creation of the Hartford Stadium Authority and the powers bestowed upon it to issue bonds 
allowed for the city developers to have direct access to the capital they needed without the public 
intervening. This arrangement undermined the people of the North End's ability to make their 
own decisions regarding their community, which left residents no choice but to simply accept the 
plans of those in positions of higher power than them such as government officials and 
developers. This situation appears all too familiar for North End residents, who are historically 
and contemporarily marginalized. Comments from the public forums confirmed this. “Why 
should we trust you (Hartford’s government) with our money?” one woman questioned and 
others echoed  (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). This demonstrates the level of distrust 
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already present between Hartford residents and city leaders. Not putting DoNo’s proposal to a 
city wide vote only exacerbated this distrust.  
 Hartford bypassed community involvement in the financing of DoNo for a simple 
logistical reason: money. Hartford, being a cash-strapped city, could not have afforded to finance 
the baseball stadium through their own tax revenue. Additionally, Hartford received no support 
from state and inter-municipal agencies that have the ability to finance redevelopment projects. 
For example, the State of Connecticut Bond Commission exists to facilitate the use of bond 
financing for redevelopment and public works projects. The commission approves financing 
projects, takes ownership of the property, and uses the authority of the state, and state taxpayers, 
as assurance for repayment (State Bond Commission). The Bond Commission is no stranger to 
redevelopment projects in Hartford, particularly stadiums. The state facilitated the 
redevelopment of Rentschler Field, where the University of Connecticut Huskies play football, 
Dillion Stadium, a soccer field attempting to attract a professional team, and the XL Center, 
home to Uconn’s basketball teams (Carlesso 2018). In each case, the state led the development, 
allowing Hartford to reap the benefits of the project, but shielding them from having to bear the 
burden of bond repayment. Similarly, Capital Region Redevelopment Agency, a quasi-public 
entity that finances redevelopment projects in Hartford and surrounding towns and was 
established by the state of Connecticut, also chose not to aid in the financing of the stadium 
(Capital Region Redevelopment Agency). Finally, as stated previously, Connecticut’s tax 
policies are governed by a system of “home-rule,” meaning tax monies cannot be shared across 
county lines, ultimately keeping the tax money of those in the suburbs, who likely would be 
using the as well stadium, from aiding in the building of the stadium.  
 Taken together, the state of Connecticut and the Capital Region Redevelopment Agency 
made divisive decisions not to aid in the financing of the baseball stadium. This decision was 
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made in spite of state and regional officials recognizing that the city’s bond deal was a bad idea. 
Then governor Dannel Malloy admitted that he had “not been a fan of this transaction” and made 
no attempt to hide his discontent (Altimari 2016). Whether intentionally or not, by choosing non-
intervention the state allowed its capital city, and its most economically precarious municipality, 
to assume a large amount of risk with no safety net. Meanwhile, people across the state would 
get to enjoy the benefits of the stadium once built. This aligns with Hartford County and the state 
of Connecticut’s positionality regarding Hartford. The city gets used as the capitol seat and an 
insurance cluster, but the people living there remain overlooked. This illustrates how the 
financing arrangement mirrors  pre-existing divisions, by existing without state or regional 
funding sources, and how, in turn, the financing left Hartford even more economically 
vulnerable. Given that the stadium could not have happened without a financialization scheme 
similar to this, this arrangement demonstrates a fundamental issue present within post-industrial 
redevelopment financing. 
 
Deepening Divisions: Hartford’s Misplaced Faith in DoNo’s Future 
 DoNo’s financing not only exposes previously created inequalities, it also exacerbates 
them. Plainly, the issuing of bonds places steep expectations on the city’s future. Like Rachel 
Weber suggests, Hartford essentially sold its city’s future. In the case of Hartford, the Stadium 
Authority issued bonds, and the city promised to pay the interest. These payments amount to a 
little more than four million dollars a year for the next twenty years after issuance, according to 
Hartford’s then Treasurer (Haar 2015). Hartford intended to use the revenue from the stadium to 
make these payments. Given that the city ended 2014 in nearly a $14 million dollar deficit and 
the previous year with only a $265,000 surplus, the city banked on the stadium providing the 
revenue for these payments, as its financial situation remained precarious (DC Bonds 2015, 73).  
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 To ensure that the stadium would garner enough revenue, the city and developers 
envisioned a very particular look for the rest of DoNo. This look, in notable ways, diverged 
significantly from the actual landscape. The Hartford Planning and Zoning Commission’s 
assessment of the Downtown North redevelopment bluntly states, “In the early phases, the 
housing proposed by the Developer will need to cater to young professionals based on market 
demand” (City of Hartford 2014, 6). City officials believed that the success of this project hinged 
on DoNo’s ability to attract young professionals, which is a starkly different demographic than 
the one currently in the North End. This very closely aligns with Florida’s suggestions on 
catalyzing urban growth. As a result, DoNo always appeared to be a vision bound up with the 
needs and wants of the young, urban class, as Hartford planned on paying for the rest of DoNo 
with their tourism. Integration with current North End residents is not explicitly mentioned in the 
plan. Given that the plan also requires the arrival of young professionals for market demand, the 
city demonstrates its emphasis on abiding by the pricing system of the housing market. There 
existed no explicit plans to combat this with affordable housing or rental ceilings in DoNo in its 
original plan. This illustrates how DoNo’s vision includes a very specific group of people who 
the city hopes will bring wealth to the city, but is not reflective of North Hartford residents.  
These priorities are reflected in noted changes to the Downtown North area. They exist 
specifically to accommodate the creative class. First, DoNo caters heavily to those with the 
means to drive there. DoNo’s vision includes over eight hundred square feet of parking 
throughout the six parcels (City of Hartford 2014, 6). At first, this appears ironic, because Mayor 
Pedro Segarra sold this plan to Hartford residents as a way to mitigate the “sea of parking lots” 
plaguing Downtown North (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). From this statement to 
DoNo’s vision, it appears that Mayor Segarra meant that he wanted to turn the capitalistically 
unproductive sea of parking lots into a money-making sea of parking lots.  
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Additionally, part of implementing DoNo’s development plan includes realigning two 
streets and decommissioning one (City of Hartford 2014, 4). These proposed changes attempt to 
alleviate traffic congestion around the ballpark and streamline DoNo as a place (City of Hartford, 
4). Overall, these two elements of DoNo’s plan demonstrate that city officials and developers 
intend to use DoNo to attract outsiders. The fact that many people in the North End of Hartford 
do not have cars and usually rely on public transportation (Lindsey 2020) supports this work’s 
assertion that DoNo is not intended to serve the populations of Hartford’s North End. As 
Hartford’s suburbs house the region’s wealthiest, most mobile populations, it becomes evident 
that DoNo is catered towards igniting a back to the city movement, either to live or to visit, of 
the creative class that currently surrounds and works in Hartford. Unfortunately, this movement, 
if realized, would only exaggerate the divisions between North End residents and Hartford’s 
more affluent areas.  
 Finally, a large selling point of DoNo that reappears across planning documents and 
public forums is DoNo’s emphasis on the streetscape. Streetscapes refer to the buildings, 
walkways, and general visual experience of a landscape (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). The 
Downtown North Redevelopment Plan mentions improving facades and streetscapes (City of 
Hartford 2014, 10), while the plan’s renderings include manicured streets and walking paths 
lined with trees (City of Hartford 2014, 6). This creates a space that is pedestrian friendly and 
aesthetically pleasing. The official goal of this vision is to create more traffic for local businesses 
in the area (City of Hartford 2014, 10). The logic is that someone coming to watch the Friday 
night baseball game will be enticed to look around and spend time and money in local 
businesses. 
 These modifications produce a landscape with a very specific purpose. While the original 
intention of DoNo was to act as a bridge between the North End and Hartford’s more 
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economically advantaged Main Street, DoNo’s vision lends itself to acting more like an enclave, 
than a bridge. The work of Boyer helps to illuminate why. Boyer, in talking about modern day 
cities, introduces the concept of the city tableaux. The tableaux is a pocket of development 
existing in a larger city (Boyer 1992, 184). Boyer argues that cities do not develop as a whole, as 
in with one plan in mind, but instead develop in fragments, creating areas of neglect and areas of 
profitability (Boyer 1992, 184). The areas of high profitability, tableaus, act as such because they 
have been carefully curated to evoke certain emotions and memories (Boyer 1992, 191). Within 
the tableaux, architecture, storefronts, and walkways, are all specifically curated to generate 
narrative patterns, or memory devices that help to establish meanings within places (Boyer 1992, 
188). In this way, the goal of a tableaux is for a person to step inside and experience a sort of 
alternative reality where people feel relaxed, but also curious. In doing so, the tableaux becomes 
set aside from the city as a whole. It exists as its own entity, with its own emotional and 
economic significance from the rest of the urban landscape.  
 DoNo’s vision intends to create a tableaux. Through its beautiful streetscapes and 
charming businesses it hopes to attract, DoNo attempts to build a landscape completely separate 
from that of the North End, which, in the minds of outsiders, evokes feelings of fear and images 
of poverty. Using this framework, the metaphor of DoNo as a bridge between Main Street and 
North Hartford falls apart. As a tableaux, DoNo will create an experience for outsiders contained 
within the six parcels of land it will develop. Within that boundary, DoNo will work hard to 
curate that specific image. Tied together with the previous discussion of automobiles, people will 
move from the private spaces of their cars to the privatized public space of DoNo, where all 
aspects of the landscape are carefully attended to. In this way, outsiders will never need to, nor 
have the desire to leave because the emotions and desire created from the tableaux wear off once 
one steps outside of it, and venture into the North End. As a result, DoNo, in constant pursuit of 
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the young, urban market due to the burdens placed on the city by interest payments, will never 
succeed in integrating the North End community with Downtown North. This is because it 
mirrors previous attempts at development, such as the Bishops, by isolating enclaves of 
productive and unproductive Hartford. In the case of this project, Downtown North becomes a 
productive space, while little is done to do the same for the marginalized community of North 
Hartford. Overall, this arrangement only stands to exacerbate inequalities already plaguing the 
city. 
 
A Future Foretold?: DoNo’s Current Predicament and Reimagination 
 After raising sufficient funds to start the project, DoNo LLC broke ground on the 
baseball stadium in 2015. Quickly, problems began to emerge. The project, which was expected 
to be completed in time for the spring 2016 baseball season, was chronically over budget and 
behind schedule. The completion date came and went in Hartford, with no sign of the finish line. 
Eventually, the Stadium Authority revoked the developer’s insurance bond, fired them, and 
finished the stadium with a different company (Carlesso and Gosselin 2017). Dunkin Donuts 
Stadium finally opened in the Spring of 2017 (Carlesso and Gosselin 2017). In its three years of 
play, baseball games at the stadium have become quite popular, even selling out many games. 
However, the revenue generated from the full capacity of the stadium fails to cover the $4 
million interest payments (Carlesso 2019). Meanwhile, the rest of DoNo, which would have 
helped make up the difference, stood at a standstill for three years while DoNo LLC and 
Hartford ligated over the firing (Carlesso 2019). 
 This outcome says a lot about financing agreements and public-private partnerships. The 
developer’s inability to deliver a stadium on time and one budget reflects an ever present danger 
with public-private partnerships: the added risk of the private sector. In Hartford’s case, the city 
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assumed the risks, the interest payments, of the stadium on the promise that the developers 
would execute their end of the deal. When the developers did not deliver, they received the 
consequence of being fired and sued. While this clearly hurt the company, it does not equal the 
consequences borne by the city of Hartford. In the three years since the firing, Hartford continues 
to spend money it cannot afford to make interest payments on the stadium. The rest of DoNo 
remains unmaterialized. Because the two sides battled in court, the sea of parking lots remained 
just that. This illustrates one of the largest inequalities that exists in public-private partnerships, 
that the private entity will never be asked to sacrifice as much as the municipality.  
 This outcome also further demonstrates how the financing agreement widens pre-existing 
inequalities. First, Hartford’s indebtedness made DoNo’s vision of the historical tableaux even 
more of a necessity, as opposed to a desired outcome. Because Hartford’s financial situation 
remains worse than when the project started, it requires the wealth of the creative class even 
more now. In turn, this heightens the city’s desire to cater to Hartford’s productive corridors over 
the less productive areas, such as the North End. Additionally, the state of Connecticut in 2018 
bailed out Hartford because the city faced imminent bankruptcy (Carlesso 2019). Because of its 
large debt obligations, partly including the interest payments, Hartford remained in real danger 
of default. To prevent this, the state of Connecticut assumed Hartford’s general obligation debts 
(Carlesso 2019). However, it refused to assume the debts from the baseball stadium and further 
denied the city the ability to use taxes on ticket sales from games to pay the debt (Carlesso 
2019). This reflects the profound inequality between the state of Connecticut and its capital city. 
The state allowing Hartford to continue to pay for the stadium only further inhibits the city’s 
ability to improve its economic situation.  
 While Hartford’s relationship with DoNo caused the city political and economic turmoil, 
the project remains ongoing. In fact, as of 2021, the first part of DoNo, including restaurants and 
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housing, just broke ground. The city selected a new developer, and seems to have reimagined 
DoNo with more care for the pre-existing landscape. Now called North Crossing, the project will 
largely be financed by the Capital Region Development Authority (Gosselin 2021). This 
injection of money also means that the city will be able to put more affordable housing in the 
space, which would not have been possible otherwise (Gosselin 2021). This is a positive sign for 
the project and the city. By harnessing capital and dispersing risk more equitably across 
Hartford’s metropolitan area, the project becomes less risky for Hartford residents. Additionally, 
adding affordable housing to the plan shows a desire to aid, rather than further ostracize 
Hartford’s low income residents, which illustrates a greater care for overcoming the large 
economic divide present in the city. This creates a bit of optimism. It now appears as though both 
the developers and the city are more seriously taking into account Hartford’s landscape, and are 
being more particular about how to best finance and construct the project to avoid the mistakes 




 Overall, the financing of DoNo held little regard for Hartford’s landscape. This meant 
that the injection of finance, via bonds, simply mapped over the landscape, exposing and 
threatening to widen inequalities that previously existed. I argue that the project introduced risk 
into communities that were already marginalized, while promising benefits to communities that 
already benefit from Hartford County’s spatial arrangement. This attempt at redevelopment, 
unfortunately, ended poorly for Hartford. Only through reimagining the development project 
with a greater eye towards Hartford’s particular contexts, can the city hope to create positive 
change and sustainable economic growth for those who need it most 
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Chapter 5 
“Stop Dividing the City”: Reimagining Post-Industrial Urban Finance 
 Here, I have attempted to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this work by the 
residents of Hartford: what will DoNo do for Hartford and its North End communities? In its 
original form, I argue, not much, I argue. Analyzing the particulars of the financing arrangement 
within the city’s public-private partnership reveals that little attention was paid to Hartford’s pre-
existing spatial inequalities. This proved to be a fatal mistake for the project. As Hartford and the 
Stadium Authority began financing the baseball stadium, it became clear that the project kept 
open and threatened to widen these economic and social divisions.  
 This case study allows me to articulate a greater point about financing in the post 
industrial city. Not every city experiences intense inequalities like Hartford, but every city 
remains steeped in local institutional, social, and racial contexts. This work argues that these 
contexts matter a lot. In fact, as seen in Hartford, a city's pre-existing landscape might just be a 
determining factor in understanding how effective a financed-based redevelopment project can 
be. Theorists like Smith, Theordore and Brenner emphasize that local situations remain 
paramount in interpreting large phenomena, such as neoliberalism, on the urban scale. This work 
takes that assertion a step further to argue that, without taking local contexts into account, the 
private sector will not be able to create meaningful, positive differences for the local community. 
Ultimately, the devil really is in the details. If left unchecked, financial arrangements distribute 
the risks and rewards of projects across all too familiar lines of privilege. As seen in Hartford, 
the city assumed more risk than the surrounding cities and the North End assumed more risk than 
the city’s Central Business District. The private sector simply does not provide protections for 
marginalized groups within the public-private partnership framework.   
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Why Should We Care?: Contextualizing Hartford in the Greater Post-Industrial Struggle  
 Cities like Hartford, Detroit, Pittsburgh, etc., continue to ponder the best way to emerge 
from their post-industrial slumps. As urban entrepreneurs, they are forced to reckon with how to 
finance their redevelopment projects most effectively. This becomes particularly precarious in 
poorer cities, who are forced to engage in riskier arrangements to attract private investment. 
Meaningful scholarship into how financial markets interact with the post-industrial landscape 
can help give municipalities the tools and language necessary to understand the risks they are 
assuming and how those risks distribute themselves across groups of people. This can allow 
urban governments and residents to balance the power within the public-private partnership. 
Private entities hedge their investments with high interest rates and diverse portfolios, whereas 
cities do not have that luxury. Knowing the implications of these arrangements allows cities to 
have more knowledge and negotiating power when creating a public-private partnership.  
 Meanwhile, these projects and their financing create profound changes on the landscape. 
Whether positive or negative, the effects remain significant. For example, a project meant to 
create wealth for the city often involves attracting wealthy people to the city. This can lead to 
gentrification, rising rents and changing demographics, or enclaves, where benefits remain 
concentrated among a certain group of people. For underserved populations, this can make living 
in the city unpleasant or even unattainable. When these changes become noticeable, it may be 
too late for municipalities to impose rent controls or other measures to stop their rapidly 
transforming neighborhoods. Having a greater understanding of how these projects, especially 
their financing, can help municipalities better decide which projects to fund and how. 
Additionally, it can allow municipalities to get ahead of these transformations to selectively plan 
to at least better control their outcomes so as to not exclude previous residents from assuming the 
benefits of these projects.  
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The Future of Development Projects: Can They Ever Be Sustainable?  
 The work of this thesis brings to light an important question regarding the viability of 
development projects. Following the argument presented here, one might be wondering if 
financed based development projects can enact positive change in their communities. Can 
financing ever be a sustainable way to redevelop a city? Unfortunately, there exists no concrete 
answers to this question. Many urban scholars and policy makers continue to develop analyses 
and best practices for urban development. This work closes out by suggesting some ways in 
which cities can generate wealth and improve the lives of their citizenry without experiencing all 
of the risks associated with public-private partnerships.  
 First, and seemingly most obviously, public-private partnerships must include the public. 
Community members must feel included, listened to, and respected throughout the process. As 
seen in Hartford, DoNo remained largely unpopular among residents, which led to resistance and 
increased distrust between government officials and the population. However, most residents 
were interested in discussing alternative forms of development. Many concerned residents voiced 
their opinions regarding where funding and energy should go. For example, one resident talked 
of renovations and increased resources to the public libraries instead of the baseball stadium. 
When a redevelopment project does not heed the concerns of the people, but is built anyway, it 
sends a clear message that the project is not for them.  
DoNo actually did respond to community feedback in one particular instance, which 
serves as a positive example for how governments should be listening to community voices. 
DoNo’s original plan presented at Hartford’s first community meeting did not include a grocery 
store (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). Subsequently that night, many residents spoke 
passionately about the North End’s food desert and advocated that the DoNo, if created, include 
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a grocery store. In the next meeting, a town council debate, the project included a grocery store 
(Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014c). At that meeting, a representative from the grocery store 
chain spoke to many of the citizen’s concerns, including its size and offerings (Office of Mayor 
Pedro Segarra 2014c). While developers remain skeptical that “grocery stores do not drive 
growth,” community activists held the developers accountable for keeping a grocery store in the 
plans (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). Governments should put aside their growth and 
profit generating mindset to, above all, care for the residents surrounding the development. In the 
case of Hartford, this did only come after significant backlash from the original plan. Ideally, 
citizens would be involved at every stage of the planning process. Focus groups, community 
discussions, and even community led-projects all are great avenues for increasing resident 
involvement from the beginning. 
Second, as mentioned above, the public should not assume the most amount of risk in a 
public-private partnership. This arrangement causes tremendous harm to municipalities, whose 
citizens ultimately bear the costs of redevelopment regardless of whether or not benefits will 
materialize. The public-private partnership can be reimagined, allowing the private agent to 
assume more of the risk. Perhaps, the interest payments to the private sector from the public 
sector can become more fluid. This might mean that if a project underperforms, a municipality 
can opt to pay less in interest until it has the ability to do so. In this arrangement, the city will not 
put its own credit ratings, tax rates, and overall health of its budget at risk to be able to make 
interest payments. Additionally, governments should be able to better control how their 
neighborhoods change as a result of redevelopment. For example, they could impose rent 
controls to prevent luxury housing complexes from increasing fair market values on apartments. 
Governments and citizens can also work together to assert more control in deciding which 
businesses can operate in which neighborhoods. This can help to ensure that residents are getting 
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their needs met and voices heard, and are not simply made to watch their neighborhood become 
gentrified for wealthy outsiders. Finally, public-private partnerships can mandate that the private 
entity invest in the urban landscape in some meaningful way other than the redevelopment 
project. To use the example of Hartford, perhaps the developer, in addition to being paid to build 
the stadium, offers to spend a certain amount of their revenue on library renovations. This gets 
the private entity more involved in the urban fabric and provides a benefit for the city.  
 
Hartford as the Spark 
 Ultimately, I decided to study Hartford to help conceptualize my own experiences living 
in Hartford County, and to understand why Connecticut’s own capital city remains such an 
enigma. In this way, I designed my project to contribute not only to the growing body of 
literature on post-industrial cities, but also to study Hartford in a meaningful way. Throughout 
my research, the word “spark” came up alot. Developers consistently argued that the baseball 
stadium was the spark the city needed to redevelop Downtown North. However, after studying 
Hartford, I believe the city’s brightest spark is its own people. Looking past Hartford's reputation 
in the media, one will see a vibrant city, filled with businesses built with love, passionate 
activists, and many people who simply care about the city and its residents. In other words, will 
baseball be the spark to redevelopment in Hartford? No. Can Hartford achieve meaningful 
development that benefits North End residents as much as wealthy suburbs? That answer 
depends on the willingness of the local and state governments to ignite the spark that already 
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